LOBBYING BY FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS ON THE
SUGAR ACT AMENDMENTS OF 196z
DANIEL

M. BERMAN*

AND ROBERT

A.

HEINEMANt

INTRODUCTION

During congressional consideration of what were to become the Sugar Act
Amendments of 1962, lobbying by representatives of foreign governments reached
something of an all-time high in intensity. Events had conspired to create in a
number of sugar-producing countries a passionate, if understandable, interest in the
latest revision of a United States program that had been on the books since 1934.
The program had been brought into existence by the Jones-Costigan Act.' This
act was passed at least partly for the purpose of protecting domestic sugar producers
by keeping the price of their commodity at an artificially high level. In an attempt
to stabilize the price and supply of sugar, the act imposed a system of regulation upon
the industry. One of the principal devices to be employed was an arrangement
for the allocation of quotas to domestic and foreign suppliers on the basis of the
Secretary of Agriculture's annual estimate of the nation's sugar needs?
Under normal circumstances, the regulated supply assured by the quota system
caused the domestic market price of sugar to be higher than the world market price.
But to encourage the availability of a reliable supply of sugar from other countries,
Congress permitted sugar interests in the foreign nations that held quotas to retain
the premium resulting from the higher domestic price. Cuba was the main beneficiary of the quota system, both because it had become the chief foreign supplier
of sugar and because it was the foreign source of sugar that was closest to the East
and Gulf Coasts, where most United States refineries are located. It received not
only the largest quota, but a preferential tariff rate as well.
The first extensive congressional revision of the program contained in the JonesCostigan Act took place in 1947. An administrative regulation, issued in x936, had
awarded several countries a preferred status in the event that it proved necessary to
buy sugar from other than quota countries. The Sugar Act of 1948 gave statutory
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sanction to this arrangement, and assigned to countries that enjoyed the preferred
status a total of 1.36 per cent of the foreign quota.5 In 1951 this figure was raised
to four per cent.6 The countries that gained the most from this revision were the
Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Haiti, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Peru.
In i956, Congress provided a more specific legislative basis for the allocation of
sugar quotas, when it wrote extensive directions into the text of the statute.7 For
the first time, the law itself contained an estimate of the nation's sugar needs. Although the Secretary of Agriculture would continue to make more current estimates,
the congressional figure would provide the basis for minimum quotas on which
foreign suppliers might depend. The quota that Congress incorporated into the
law was to be apportioned on a percentage basis among domestic and foreign producers. An allocation formula for market growth above the basic quota was also
provided. According to the formula, Cuba and the Philippines-which were the
major foreign sources of sugar-would have a steadily decreasing share of the
sugar that the United States might need in excess of the basic congressional figure.8
The 1956 legislation was due to expire on December 31, 1966. Before that date,
however, an entirely new situation had arisen to inspire a number of foreign countries with visions of new profits to be made in the United States sugar market.
Strained relations between the United States and revolutionary Cuba prompted
President Eisenhower in i96o to request authority to cut or even withhold entirely
the Cuban quota? Congress granted the presidential request, devised a formula
for the reallocation of the Cuban quota, and extended the basic sugar legislation for
three months.'0 On July 7, 1960, Eisenhower made use of his authority to cancel
the remaining portion of Cuba's i96o quota."
According to the formula that was promulgated by Congress in i96o, the
Dominican Republic was to receive the largest share of the cancelled Cuban quota.
It was at this time, however, that the Organization of American States voted for
economic sanctions against the Trujillo regime in the Dominican Republic.' 2
Although President Eisenhower promptly requested statutory authority to withhold
the Dominican share of the Cuban reallocation,'" Congress adjourned without taking
action on the request. 4 To compensate for this legislative inaction, the Administration levied a special import fee on the reallocated sugar.'5 The result was that the
'6I Stat. 922
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premium on this Dominican sugar was effectively eliminated.
In 1961, Congress extended the sugar legislation to June 30, 1962, and directed
the President to give consideration "to countries of the Western Hemisphere and
to those countries purchasing United States agricultural commodities" when reallocating the Cuban quota1 The Department of Agriculture, in administering
this Act, gave temporary reallocations of the Cuban quota to a number of countries
that had no permanent quota status. Other countries received reallocations in excess
of their existing quotasir
Foreign sugar interests were hopeful that the foundation had been laid for securing
a permanent or increased quota, as the case might be, in the new sugar legislation
that Congress was expected to enact in i962. There was a general expectation that
Congress would make cuts in the Cuban reserve quota in 1962, and thus pave the
way for the indefinite entrenchment of new foreign sugar interests in the American
market.
The Kennedy Administration, however, had come to the conclusion that the
situation was getting out of control. Its position was explained in some detail in an
address by Lawrence Myers, director of the Sugar Division of the Commodity
Stabilization Service in the Department of Agriculture.' 9 Myers focused attention
on the shortcomings of the country quota system, emphasizing that the exclusion of
Cuba meant that there could no longer be complete assurance of stability in either
the supply or the price of sugar. He also pointed out that the premium allowed
to quota areas was in actuality an exceedingly inefficient form of foreign aid.20
Myers called for a global quota that would allow foreign interests to bid competitively
for the United States market and enable Cuba to regain her place in this market
when normal relations were re-established.
But the Administration was in a weak position to achieve the goals that Myers
had described. There was almost no support, even within the Executive Branch
itself, for abolition of the country quota system. Only the State Department backed
"The act also gave the President authority to withhold the Dominican share of the reallocation. 75
Stat. 40 (xg61), 7 U.S.C.A. § 1158 (Supp. 1963). The Dominican Republic received a portion of the
Cuban quota when diplomatic relations with the United States were re-established after the overthrow of
the Trujillo government.
"' Countries receiving new quotas were: Australia, Brazil, the countries of the British West Indies
(although British Guana had had a small quota), Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Fiji Islands, French
West Indies, Guatemala, India, and Ireland. U.S. FOREIGN AGRICULTURE SERvieE, DEP'r oF AGRICULTURE,
NEw SUGAR LEGISLATION INCREASES FOREIGN SOURCES O SUPPLY, FOR.EIGN AORICULTnRE CIRCULAR, SUGAR
FS 4-62, at 3 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Naw SUGAR LEGISLATION].
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the Administration position without reservation, and the White House was more

concerned with the bills on agriculture and trade expansion?' Industrial users of
sugar, who have to pay the higher prices engendered by the quota system, were
relatively passive, for none of them gain a competitive advantage under the system
22
and almost all are in a position to shift the added cost to the consumer.
Foreign sugar interests could see that the vacuum resulting from the existence of
the vacant Cuban quota and the lack of support for the Administration's position
had created a golden opportunity for them to improve their position in the United
States sugar market. Accordingly, they were willing to spend considerable sums of
money to achieve results at this opportune moment by means of intensive lobbying
efforts. The lobbyists who represented them did not fail them. The extraordinary
success of their campaign makes it important to investigate the methods they
employed.
I
Ti LOBBYISTS
During the hearings held by the Senate Finance Committee on the 1962 sugar bill,
Senator J. William Fulbright (D., Ark.) expressed displeasure with the fact that
foreign interests generally followed the practice of hiring Americans to argue their
case for sugar quotas.2 3 Fulbright, who is chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, said he felt that it would be far preferable for such presentations to
be made by official diplomatic representatives-such as commercial attaches-of the
countries concerned. Evidently, however, foreign governments believe that such
a procedure would not be preferable from their point of view. For one thing, the
Government of the United States is a highly complex entity, and even a knowledgeable foreigner might find it exceedingly difficult to pinpoint the critical spots in which
pressure might influence decisions. In addition, there is a feeling that the Government is more receptive to American citizens than to foreign nationals. Especially
when the stakes are high, foreign interests appear convinced that they are wise
to employ United. States citizens to promote their cause.
But an American who acts as a foreign lobbyist finds himself at a serious disadvantage compared with the lobbyist who represents domestic interests. The
domestic lobbyist has power behind him, for in the final analysis he represents votes.
As a consequence, congressmen will tend to treat him with respect, even if the
legislation for which he is campaigning is illogical in terms of the national interest.
In contrast, the lobbyist for a foreign nation can exercise no such "legitimate"
1

"For a comment on the lack of Administration enthusiasm, see N.Y. Times, July 8, 962, § 4, P. 5,

col. x (weather ed.).
"'Interview with Lawrence Myers, Director, Sugar Division, Department of Agriculture, January

22,

x963.
'Hearings Before the Senate Commitee on Finance on H.R. 12154, Sugar Act 4mendments of 1962,
87 th Cong., 2d Sess. 357-58 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Sugar Act Amendments]. For a sympathetic
approach to the Fulbright idea, see The Lobby Network, The New Republic, July 16, 1962, p. 7.
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pressure, for he commands the votes of no American citizens. Unless he can
prove that what his principal wants would be in the national interest of the United
States, there is no political reason why congressmen should listen to him.
It is thus understandable that the agents of foreign governments are tempted to
resort to unconventional methods of lobbying. But it is impossible to learn from the
reports which they are legally required to file exactly how they use to the best
advantage the abundant resources that are made available to them. The reports, as a
mater of fact, tend to raise questions, rather than to provide answers.
The case of a lobbyist named I. Irving Davidson is fairly typical. From 1955
through 1959, Davidson was employed by President Luis Somoza of Nicaragua. His
receipts from this source were only $6,ooo in 1955, and rose to a still comparatively
modest $22,ooo in 1956. The following year, they remained at this same level. But
in I958, they jumped to $374,035, only to drop back to $89,o9o in 1959.2 The records
are vague as to how the extraordinary sum of $374,035 was spent in 1958, and why
that year was so special in the lives of I. Irving Davidson and Luis Somoza. An
examination of the foreign agent registration files of the Department of Justice
provides only the most general explanation of how the large increase was spent.
Although the registration form provides spaces for facts about the date, amount,
purpose, and recipient of each expenditure, these headings were ignored by Davidson
in favor of a general statement in narrative form 2
Some foreign principals attempt to provide incentive for their lobbyists in the
form of contingency agreements 7 The typical such contract calls for payment of
a base fee to the lobbyist, with additional sums hinging upon the size of the quota
that the principal is awarded. But if the contingent fee helps to spur a lobbyist to
work hard, it also may invite him to work unscrupulously. President Kennedy was
clearly engaging in understatement when he told a press conference that "it's an unfortunate situation where men are paid large fees by foreign governments to secure
that is not satisquotas and where, in some cases, there are contingency fees ...
factory."2
The payment of contingent fees is only one of the methods employed by foreign
governments to make up for the fact that they cannot exert normal political pressures.
Another is the tendency to retain lobbyists with political influence to sell. Thus, many
(938); 53 Stat. 1244 (1939); 56 Stat. 248 (1942).
25 107 CONG. Ric. II010 (x961).
' See file on I. Irving Davidson, Registration No. 886, Supplemental Registration Statement for Six2.52 Stat. 631

Month Period Ending October 18, 1958, answer 9(c).
"' Oscar Chapman (Mexico), James W. Riddell (India), Albert S. Nemir (Brazil), and Ernest Schein
(Colombia) worked on such a basis in 1962.

For a table showing how much more the House bill was
For
CONG. REc. 11045 (daily ed. June 27, 1962).

worth to them than the Administration bill, see xo8
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AND OTmR REPRESENTATIVES WHO ExPEEssE INTER=r IN THE SuoA AcT AMENDMENTS OF
8, 15, 30-31, 35-36 (Comm. Print 1962) [hereinafter cited as COMPENDIUM].
12154)
2
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of the lobbyists hired by foreign sugar interests are men who have held important
government jobs or positions of influence.
In the lobbying over the 1956 extension to the Sugar Act, for instance, two Cuban
sugar associations were represented by the firm of Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen, and Ball."
George W. Ball, a partner in the firm, was to become Under Secretary of State
in the Kennedy Administration. Examples of influential sugar lobbyists who were
interested in the 1962 legislation include the following:

I. Oscar L. Chapman, a representative of Mexican sugar interests, who was
President Truman's Secretary of the Interior. 0
2. Robert L. Farrington, retained by Republic of China interests, who is
former general counsel of the Department of Agriculture.
3. Ganson Purcell, in the employ of Nicaraguan sugar interests, who was chairman
of the Securities and Exchange Commission under Presidents Roosevelt and Truman.
4. Charles H. Brown, a representative of the Fiji Islands, who was, from 1957 to
I96, a Democratic congressman from Missouri.3 ' (Taking advantage of this fact,
Brown began his statement to the House Agriculture Committee with an expression
of appreciation for "this opportunity to be back in this room with this very fine
committee. I tried to serve on this committee for 4 years while I was here .... ,2
5. James H. Rowe, Jr., retained by Haitian interests, who is a former administrative assistant to President Franklin D. Roosevelt, assistant attorney general (i94i1943), and counsel to the Senate Majority Policy Committee (1956).
6. Rocco Siciliano, representing El Salvador sugar interests, who is a former
assistant secretary of labor (I953-i957) and special assistant to the President for
3
personnel management (,957-1959)
7. Ernest Schein, the lobbyist for Colombian sugar interests, who is chairman of
the District of Columbia Board of Elections. 34
8. Walter Sterling Surrey, hired by sugar interests of the Dominican Republic and
of the French West Indies, who is a former consultant to the State Department and
to the Economic Cooperation Administration. (Another Dominican representative,
Philip F. Maguire, was formerly a special assistant to President Truman.) 35
9. Sheldon Z. Kaplan, on the payroll of Guatemalan interests, who is a former
staff member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee3 6 and a former legal assistant
"IThe National Cuban Sugar Mill Owners Association and the Cuban Sugar Cane Growers Association.
,07 CONG. REC. 11009 (ig6i). During this period, the firm earned $87,000 in fees. N.Y. Times, Feb.
5, 1963, p. 1, col. 3 (western ed.). In 1962 the firm (now Cleary, Gottlieb, and Steen) represented,
inter alia, Australian sugar interests. CoMPENDIum,
op. cit. supra note 27, at 7.
goxo8 CoNG. Rac. is6og (daily ed. July 2, x962).
",Sugar Lobby Reports, 20 CONG. Q. WEEra.Y REPoRT 1173-74 (week ending July x3, 1962).
12 Hearings on H.R. z173o, Sugar, Before the House Committee on Agriculture, 87 th Cong., 2d Seas.
443 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Sugar].
"Sugar Lobby Reports, supra note 31, at 1174.
"'U.S. CONGRESSONAL DRcEoRY 638 (1962).
"5Sugar Lobby Reports, supra note 31, at 1174.
"Washington Post, July 5, 1962, p. A4, col. z.
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to Senatot Thomas A. Dodd (D., Conn.), (himself at one time a representative of
Guatemalan interests) .7
io. James W. Riddell, employed by sugar interests in India, who at one time
served on the staff of the House Ways and Means Committee.3 8
A number of the lobbyists have an extremely important commodity to sell: friendship with Congressman Harold D. Cooley (D., N.C.), chairman of the House Agriculture Committee.3 9 Without doubt, Cooley is the key to sugar legislation. His
power is the result of a combination of constitutional and parliamentary factors in
his favor.
The constitutional source of Cooley's power is the fact that sugar legislation, since
it involves taxation, must originate in the House4 This requirement makes it
possible for Cooley, as chairman of the committee in charge, to delay proposed
sugar legislation until late in a congressional session or until shortly before the
scheduled expiration of existing legislation.'
Pressure of time is then usually
sufficient to force the Cooley measure through the Senate, without significant alteration. For example, it was not until June xg, 1962, that the House passed a sugar bill
to replace legislation due to expire only eleven days later, when the fiscal year would
end.
Like the constitutional factor, parliamentary rules and customs contribute to
Cooley's power over sugar. Although he may be a weak chairman when his committee is considering legislation on other commodities,4 2 Cooley is indisputably in
charge when it comes to sugar legislation. Unlike bills on all other commodities,
sugar legislation is screened not by a subcommittee but by the full Agriculture
Committee 3 This procedure, of course, enhances Cooley's power over sugar, since
he is chairman of the parent committee. Members of the committee are extremely
unwilling to risk incurring his wrath, because he may take revenge regarding other
legislation in which they are interested. In 1962, it happened that Congress was
considering a controversial Administration farm bill, for which Cooley's support was
direly needed. Thus, while Administration supporters on the committee were dis"Iln spite of Dodd's former connections, he was almost put in charge of a projected "investigation"
by the Senate Judiciary Committee into sugar lobbying. The planned inquiry was cancelled after the
New York Times gave front-page treatment to an article that included this paragraph: "Heading the
Judiciary group will be Senator Thomas J. Dodd, Democrat of Connecticut, who in 1957 and z958 was
a registered foreign agent for the government of Guatemala. He received a total of $66,666.58 in fees,
according to statements he filed with the Department of Justice." N.Y. Times, July 7, 1962, p. x, col. I
(city ed.). See also N.Y. Times, July 9, 1962, p. 1, col. 3.
"8 Washington Post, July 5, 1962, p. A4 , col. I.
" See N.Y. Times, July 3, x962, p. 1, col. 3 and id. July 4, x962, p. 1, col. 2.
0 U.S. CoNsr., art. I, § 7.
"' Cater & Pincus, Our Sugar Diplomacy, The Reporter, April 13, 1961, p. 27. Walter Pincus is now
directing the investigation by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee into foreign lobbying activities.
42 See Jones, Representation in Congress: The Case of the House Agriculture Committee, 55 AM.
PoL. Sc. RE. 359 (g6I).
"'See also id. at 361; Sugar, supra note 32, at i.
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gruntled with the chairman's handling of the sugar bill, they were unwilling to
provoke him at that particular time.
Since Cooley and the House Agriculture Committee constitute the most important single influence on sugar legislation, it is little wonder that foreign governments with an interest in sugar try to cultivate both the chairman and the members
of the committee. In 1955, for instance, the Trujillo regime offered the committee
an expenses-paid trip to the Dominican Republic-only two months before the committee was scheduled to open hearings on the extension of sugar legislation.44
Cooley and his wife chose not to make the trip, but his son, daughter-in-law, and
sister (who was clerk of the committee) accepted the invitadon 5 Apparently
several members of the committee did, too, for a Neu York Times reporter found
in the Dominican archives a letter from Committee Vice Chairman W. R. Poage
(D., Tex.), thanking Trujillo for the "outstanding hospitality" shown to the committee.46 Cooley, himself, does not feel that it was improper for the Dominican
Republic to pay the committee's traveling expenses 7 The author of the following
limerick might be expected to disagree:
There was a young lady from Kent
Who said that she knew what it meant
When men took her to dine,
Gave her cocktails and wine,
She knew what it meant-but she went. 48
II
THE SUGAR AcT AmENDmNTS
On May 14, I962, the Administration submitted to Congress its bill to deal with
the sugar problem#4 The legislation proposed, in effect, the elimination of the
country quota system after an interval of five years. During the transitional period,
gradually increasing import fees would be imposed on quota sugar. These fees
would dispel the advantage of selling sugar in the artificially high American market.
At the end of five years, the fees would be so high that they would entirely wipe out
the difference between the premium domestic price and the lower world market
price.
The Agriculture Committee heard testimony on the Administration bill from a
parade of witnesses, including numerous representatives of foreign sugar interests.
The foreign lobbyists, of course, opposed the bill. But they went much farther and
"'N.Y.
Times, July 3, 1962, P. 5, cOl. I.
' 5 Cater & Pincus, supra note 41.
"N.Y. Times, July 3, 1962, P. 5, col. I.
" Cater & Pincus, supra note 41.
"DoN K. PiucE, GOVERNMENT AND SCIENCE 96 (1954).
"H.R. 11730 (a bill to amend and extend the provisions of the Sugar Act of 1948, as amended),

87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962).
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urged the committee to increase already existing quotas and establish new ones as
well. When the committee reported out a bill on June 15, 1962,"' the foreign lobbyists
could not have been happier. All but one had succeeded in persuading the committee
of the justice of their cause.5 1
The committee bill retained the full quota premium, greatly enlarged the quotas
of most of the countries that were already benefiting from the system, and gave
quotas to fifteen new areas." The bill also provided a formula for temporarily
allocating the remainder of the Cuban reserve quota to specified areas. 3
The House passed the committee bill on June 1g, x962, by a vote of 319-72." 4 But
when the legislation reached the Senate, it ran into serious trouble. At the very
outset, lobbyists who testified before the Senate Finance Committee in support of
the House bill were subjected to a searching interrogation. Openly hostile questions
came from Senators Fulbright and Paul H. Douglas (D., Ill.) . As chairman of
the Foreign Relations Committee, Fulbright had already ordered a staff study of the
activities of foreign lobbyists.!' It was not surprising, therefore, that the hearings
occasionally sounded more like a lobbying investigation than like an inquiry into
proposed sugar legislation.
Many of the lobbyists who had testified before the House Agriculture Committee
did not bother to appear at the Senate hearings. At least one of them stayed away
57
because he was confident that the House bill would not be appreciably changed.
Such optimists were in for a rude awakening, however. The bill reported out by the
Senate Finance Committee on June 26, 1962, was almost a carbon copy of the
original Administration measure that the House had emasculated. The new quotas
and reallocations added by the House were dropped, old quotas were reduced
to levels not far from those proposed by the White House, and the drastic Administration position on import fees was accepted.5" The Senate promptly approved the
committee bill! 9
Ultimate victory, however, was still to go to Cooley and the foreign lobbyists.
"oHouse Comm. on Agriculture, Sugar Act Amendments of 1962, H. REP. No. 1829, 87 th Cong., 2d

Sess. (1962).
"'George Bronz, who represented the sugar interests of Ireland.
"2 Argentina, Australia, Brazil, British Honduras, British West Indies, Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador,
Fiji Islands, French West Indies, Guatemala, India, Mauritius, Paraguay, and South Africa. New Sugar
Legislation, supra note 17.
" As a bit of frosting, Chairman Cooley had inserted a provision that would have required the
United States to repay to the Dominican Republic the fees this country had levied on the Dominican share
of the Cuban reallocation during Trujillo's rule. N.Y. Times, July 3, 1962, p. 5, col. x.
Ofio8 CoNG. REc. 10146 (daily ed. June r9, 1962).
" Sugar Act Amendments, supra note 23, especially pp. 3x6-318, 352-358, 433.
"

STAFF oF SENATE Comms. oN"Fo aION RELATIoNs, 87TrH CoNG., 2D SEss., NONDIPLOMATIO ACTIVITIES

op REPREsENTATIvEs OF FoREIGN GovERNmENTs at v (Comm. Print.
DIPLOMATIC Acnvrxas].

1962) [hereinafter cited as NoN-

" Quinn, interview, supra note 18.
"Senate Comm. on Finance, Sugar Act Amendments of z96 2, SE. RPEp. No. x631, 87 th Cong.,
Sess. (1962).
"'The vote was 76-2.

ao8

CoNG. REc. x1o64

(daily ed. June 27,

x962).
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The architects of their triumph were the members of the House-Senate conference
committee that was appointed to reconcile the differences between the two bills.
On almost every significant question, the Senate conferees surrendered. The reserve
quota for Cuba that they accepted was a close approximation of the House's original
figure; all new quotas proposed by the House, except those for Mauritius and
Argentina," were retained; and existing quotas were raised much as the House had
desired. Only one major substantive concession was made by the House. Approval
was given to an import fee on quota sugar, beginning at ten per cent in 1962 and
rising to thirty per cent in 1964.61

Both the House and Senate gave overwhelming approval to the conference
report, 62 and on July 13, 1962, the President signed into law the Sugar Act Amendments of 1962.63
CONCLUSION

It is not easy to find rational justification for many of the quotas that were
recommended by the House Agriculture Committee and included with little change
64
in the final legislation. Countries like Australia, the Fiji Islands, India, Mauritius,
and South Africa, to which new quotas were given, are all thousands of miles from
the United States. In an emergency, none of them could supply sugar quickly, and
they might not be able to furnish any at all in case of war. Furthermore, four of
these countries-Australia, the Fiji Islands, Mauritius, and South Africa-may need
an American subsidy less than some nations of the Western Hemisphere do, since
these four already benefit from preferential trade arrangements with the United
Kingdom.6 5 Nevertheless, each of them (as well as India) received a substantial
permanent quota from the Agriculture Committee, and all but the Fiji Islands were
given large temporary reallocations from the Cuban reserve quota. The permanent
quotas of all but Mauritius survived, if in a slightly reduced form, in the final
Act 6
was not completely left out, however, for after the enactment of the sugar bill, an
amendment giving the President authority to distribute quotas of 375,000 tons of sugar was tacked
onto an insignificant bill on the importation of honeybees. 76 Stat. 169 (1962), 7 U.S.C.A. S281 (Supp.
1963). President Kennedy, in a letter to Cooley, said that 2o,ooo tons of this would be assigned to
Argentina. N.Y. Times, July 13, x962, p. 7, col. I.
al House Comm. on Conference Report, Sugar Act Amendments of z962, H.R. RaP. No. 1957, 87th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1962). The other concessions that were made to the Senate included the following:
country quotas were to be extended to 1964 instead of to 1966, as provided in the House bill;
the reserve quota intended for Ireland was retained; and the specific formula for temporary reallocation
of the remaining Cuban reserve quota was eliminated.
0,House approval was by a vote of 248-31. IOS CONG. Rac. I15OO (daily ed. June 30, 1962). The
io8 CONG. REc. Ix620 (daily ed. July 2, 1962).
Senate accepted the conference report, 54-I.
4276 Stat. 156 (x962), 7 U.S.C.A. 5 11i1 note (Supp. 1963).
"Mauritus was dropped from the final bill in favor of the io,ooo-ton reserve that was intended for
Ireland, a doubtful improvement. The whole maneuver caused Senator John J. Williams (R., Del.) to
comment: ". •. . Apparently there are more Irish votes in Boston than there are Mauritians." xo8 CONG.
Rze. zx611 (daily ed. July 2, 1962).

0Argentina

6aSugar Act Amendments, supra note 23, at 295, 494-

66Cooley's only explanation of these extra-hemispheric quotas was a statement that"... we were told

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

Other irrationalities inthe 1962 Sugar Act were described by Fulbright on the
Senate floor. The senator said that although current statistics showed Panama
had only 5,000 tons available for export, the conference report gave it a quota of
i5,ooo tons; Guatemala received a 20,oo-ton quota although it had been able to fill
only about one-half of the lower quota it had held in x96I. The quotas of Ecuador
and Paraguay, too, were above their export capacity.P7 (Another country that
Fulbright might have mentioned was British Honduras, which received a new quota
of o,ooo tons, although its representative admitted in the Senate hearings that
it was having difficulty filling its sugar commitments to the United Kingdom.)"8

Rather obviously, reason did not determine all the quotas awarded to these
countries. The only explanation that remains is that lobbyists succeeded in diverting
the attention of key congressmen from such mundane matters as meagre productive
capacities and slow and undependable supply arrangements, and managed to turn
their thoughts to other things.
The success that the foreign lobbyists enjoyed in 1962 may have serious results
inthe cases of some of their principals. In those countries that received quotas above
their export capacities, considerable expansion of the sugar industry will probably
be attempted. If Cuba ever returns to the United States sugar market and the quotas

of these countries are abolished or even reduced, economic disaster may be the
result.
Fulbright went on to declare that sugar interests in many of these
countries, realizing the economic consequences of a Cuban-American rapprochement,
now have a vested interest in keeping the two governments at swords' points.
Thus the foreign sugar lobbyists were successful in promoting the enactment of
legislation that may not only be detrimental to the interests of the United States,
but that, in the long run, may be detrimental to the very countries whose sugar
interests the lobbyists were representing.
It is possible that the lobbyists overreached themselves in 1962 and that the future
will not be kind to them. Even before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
began its formal hearings into their activities, its staff produced a report pressing the
Department of Justice to tighten up the enforcement of existing legislation affecting
foreign agents. The report decried the failure of the Department to prosecute those
who fail to comply fully with the legal requirement that they list their activities,
by the Director of the Sugar Branch that we could not rely safely upon the Western Hemisphere for
adequate supplies of sugar at all times.. ." io8 CONG. REc. X1493 (daily ed. June 30, 1962).
07 xo8 CONG. Rac. 1i6io-ii6xi (daily ed. July 2, x962).

asSugar Act Amendments, supra note 23, at 318. The lobbyist for British Honduras, L. Blaine Liljenquist, received no fee, but he had an interest in the sugar mill that would have been built if the
country had been granted a 3o,ooo-ton quota. io8 CoN. REc. 116o8 (daily ed. July 2, x962).
"See Fulbright's remarks, io8 CONG. Rac. 116zo (daily ed. July 2, 1962).
7' Sugar Act Amendments, supra note 23, at 239-40. The heads of the House Agriculture Committee
gave little indication of any interest in the effect of sugar legislation on American foreign policy. At one
point in the hearings, Vice Chairman Poage told a witness pointedly: "You are not talking to the
Foreign Relations Committee; you are talking to the Agriculture Committee." Sugar, supra note 32,
at 511.

LOBBYING BY FOREIGN GovEaNmsNTs

expenses, and principals.P1 The lack of prosecutions, according to the staff, did not
necessarily reflect "full compliance with the law by the registrants. On the contrary, study of the foreign agent registration statements accepted as complete by the
Justice Department and placed in their public files, discloses a number of
apparent omissions and/or evasions.:'7
The Fulbright investigation will doubtless result in a more meticulous enforcement of existing laws regulating foreign lobbyists. Whether the senators on the
Foreign Relations Committee will have the courage to dig deeply into the relationships that some of their own colleagues have maintained with the lobbyists is more
doubtful. Equally speculative is the question of whether the Fulbright inquiry will
lead to the passage of new legislation to remove some of the temptations that now
exist for both foreign interests and the congressmen who control sugar legislation.
Because the Constitution guarantees the right to petition government, there may be
in the minds of some a presumption of constitutional invalidity regarding legislation
to ban certain types of foreign lobbying. The authors, however, believe that no valid
constitutional objection could be made against a narrowly drawn statute prohibiting
lobbying for pay by an American on behalf of a foreign government. It hardly seems
likely that this is the kind of petition that the framers of the first amendment
intended to protect.
7 NONDIPLO.Ae ACrIVrS, op. cit. supra note

Id.at i i.

56, at io,
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